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Corporate governance in Sri Lanka: the status quo 
Abstract 
This paper examines the existing corporate governance environment, practices, and institutional 
framework in Sri Lanka and evaluates their effectiveness to identify current issues and challenges. Sri 
Lanka is an emerging and rapidly growing market economy in South Asia with a liberalised economic and 
trade policies associated with FDI, international trade, and export-led development policies. Sri Lanka's 
corporate governance (CG) systems and practices have been largely influenced by both colonial 
economic policies and post-independence govt policies. Its CG practices consists of promoting dispersed 
ownerships, increasing size of a board and decreasing directorship per director, greater involvement of 
internationally recognized few audit firms in accounting and auditing functions, professional orientations 
of company secretariat services. The provisions of Companies Act, the role of Securities and Exchange 
Commission, professional accounting and auditing institutions, Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the 
country's regularity environment play a significant role in the implementation of CG systems in the 
country. With the rapid expansion of the corporate sector in recent years, there is need for improving the 
current regularity mechanism in the country. The paper addresses the issue of whether the current 
governance mechanisms in Sri Lanka are adequate to respond to the needs of the fast changing business 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the existing corporate governance environment, practices, and institutional 
framework in Sri Lanka and evaluates their effectiveness to identify current issues and 
challenges.  Sri Lanka is an emerging and rapidly growing market economy in South Asia with a 
liberalised economic and trade policies associated with FDI, international trade, and export-led 
development policies. Sri Lanka’s corporate governance (CG) systems and practices have been 
largely influenced by both colonial economic policies and post-independence govt policies. Its 
CG practices consists of promoting dispersed ownerships, increasing size of a board and 
decreasing directorship per director, greater involvement of internationally recognized few audit 
firms in accounting and auditing functions, professional orientations of company secretariat 
services. The provisions of Companies Act, the role of Securities and Exchange Commission, 
professional accounting and auditing institutions, Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the country’s 
regularity environment play a significant role in the implementation of CG systems in the 
country. With the rapid expansion of the corporate sector in recent years, there is need for 
improving the current regularity mechanism in the country.  The paper addresses the issue of 
whether the current governance mechanisms in Sri Lanka are adequate to respond to the needs 
of the fast changing business environment in Sri Lanka and to face the challenges posed by the 

































Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka: the status Quo 
1. Introduction 
The primary objective of this paper is to present an overview of the corporate governance 
mechanism in Sri Lanka and to discuss its recent developments together with the issues and 
challenges that the policy makers are confronted with in improving the current system. The paper 
is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a historical background of the CG practices in Sri 
Lanka; section 3 highlights recent trends; section 4 outlines the legal and regulatory framework; 
section 5 evaluates the effectiveness of the CG practises; section 6 presents the issues and 
challenges and; section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. Historical background 
Sri Lanka, which was known as Ceylon, is an emerging economy in South Asia with a relatively 
small population of 20 million and a fast developing economy in the region. Since the end of 
prolong civil war in 2009, Sri Lanka’s economy has been growing at an average growth rate of 
5.3%. Its economy has been very resilient to both internal and external shocks over the last two 
decades. Socially, Sri Lanka’s has achieved human development outcomes more consistent with 
those of high income countries (The World Bank, 2010). In recent years, the country has 
implemented many economic reforms, most prominently in trade, taxation, privatization, and 
enhancing the flexibility of the labour market. With the steady expansion of business sector in 
Sri Lanka, there has been increasing interest in corporate governance practice in Sri Lanka.  
There has been lack of studies examining corporate governance experiences in emerging 
countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Monks and Minow, 2004). Monks and Minow (2004) 
point out the significance of the emerging market economies in an inter-dependent world and in 
the context of the flow of international capital across the borders. However, Herrigel (2006) 
notes that the history of corporate governance arrangements, which has been understood as the 
constitutive processes shaping the relationship between ownership and management of 
enterprises, is a relatively new field of inquiry for business historians. 
Sri Lanka was under number of colonial masters since 1505 until it gained political 
independence in 1948 from the British rule which was the longest period in its colonial rule 
(1815-1948). Under the colonial rule, some form of formation of the capital market development 
was initiated. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) argue that the colonial economic policy 
had two strategic approaches in dealing with the colonies.  Which policy was to be suitable for a 
particular colony was decided by the mortality rate of the colonisers, traders and missionaries. 
Accordingly, if the mortality rate among them was low, then they moved to a colony and decided 
to settle down. Subsequently, they developed the property rights as they enjoyed in their parent 
countries, which constitutes the common law by British and civil law by French. Australia, New 
Zealand, and the US were chosen by the British colonisers as conducive for settlement as the 





colonizers experienced less mortality. Therefore, the systems of law prevailed in Britain was 
developed in these countries as well.  
Among the colonies, which had higher mortality rate but with natural endowments such 
as minerals, fertile land and weather for crops, such endowed colonies were used for the 
development of the parent country by exploiting to the maximum (Acemoglu and Johnson, 
2005). Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2003) argue that in an extractive environment, 
colonisers did not construct institutions that favour the development of competitive markets as 
the colonizers believed that the competitive markets could threaten the position of the extraction. 
Sri Lanka and India were attractive for geo-political strategic reasons. British naval forces could 
control the entire Indian Ocean with the natural harbours. As a result, they developed the 
common law but not to the full extent required to development of a capital market as in Australia 
and New Zealand (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Morgan (1958) argues that Sri 
Lanka was a classic example for extraction of its resources with the least development of capital 
market and its constitutive processes such as the property law and civil law. Nevertheless, the 
following milestones are important in the development of corporate governance practices in Sri 
Lanka. 
Introduction of Property Right Law in 1832  
In the nineteenth centaury, the government took title to wide areas of uncultivated hill 
land in Central Ceylon and sold them to British planters. The Waste Land Act of 1832 was 
implemented by the colonial government and accordingly Ceylonese who could not claim for 
land by documentary evidence lost the possession of their lands. These lands were sold to British 
planters and to civil servants subsequently at cheaper prices (Ceylon Banking Commission, 
1934). Although countries differ in the extent to which their legal system define and protect 
property right, this act provided the legal basis for an individual or business to hold a legal title 
for a resource that it owns.     
 
Facilitating Capital Formation and the Establishment of Colombo Share Brokers Association 
in 1896 
In order to find large scale capital for the plantation industry, the Colombo Share Brokers 
Association was established in 1896 (CSE, 2004). Plantation sector companies were the most 
significant in the corporate sector in the economy till mid 1970s in terms of creating employment 
opportunities and earning vital foreign exchange earnings (Commission of Inquiry on Agency 
Houses and Brokering Firms, 1975; Moore, 1997).  
 
Substandard Growth in Capital market in Sri Lankan until 1990s  
There has been substandard growth in the capital market until 1990s mainly due to 
colonial economic policies and repeated turnaround economic policies of post independent 
governments. Lakshman (1985) argues that the colonial government did not produce the 
necessary conditions for an organic development of capitalism on a wide front as the surpluses 
generated in the plantation sector was sent to Great Britain leaving very little for further 
accumulation in the domestic economy. Moore (1997) reports that some British firms engaged in 





tea auctions, both as buyers and sellers, undercut the prices and controlled almost everything 
from plantation to retail trade. This has happened not only in Sri Lanka but also in India as 
British planters own the industry (Tharian, 1984). As such, Tharian (1984) noted that the British 
planters and the owners of the plantation companies repatriated under invoiced profits. 
Researchers point out that even after post independent era beginning in 1948 until 1970s, several 
factors inhibited the development of a conducive environment for the growth of the corporate 
sector (Lakshman, 1985; Oberst, 1985; Snodgrass, 1998). First, the assistance programs of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had no serious involvement to develop the 
capital market (Lakshman, 1985). Second factor is the ‘Westernized elite’s continued domination 
of power’ (Oberst, 1985:760) and acceptance of economic models of the developed countries by 
the policy planners either due to the privileges they enjoyed such as scholarships and other key 
posts in some government organisations (Goonetilake, 1975).  
Apart from the above factors, Sri Lanka has experienced ‘repeated turnarounds in 
economic policy’ (Snodgrass, 1998:1). Governments in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s spent large 
sums of money on social welfare programs and in state economic activities (Blackton, 1983). La 
Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) argue that in heterogeneous societies such as in Sri Lanka, 
governments are compelled to intervene in economic activities in order to pacify the diverse 
interests of a heterogeneous society. The inability of the country to make a coherent economic 
policy prescription conducive to economic growth and development was caused by different 
political ideologies of each government which came to power unseating the incumbent 
government in each general election since its independence in 1948 (Snodgrass, 1998). In this 
sense, Nithiyanandam (2000, P. 284) notes that Sri Lanka was an ‘Economic Laboratory’.  
Growth of capital market after 1990s 
The slow growth scenario noted above changed dramatically since mid 1980s. Moore 
(1997) points out that many changes in the international environment such as the liberalisation of 
economies world wide and competition for foreign equity flows and FDI among developing 
countries led to a common understanding among mainstream national political parties in the 
country with regard to the need of having a coherent economic policies based on market 
principles. Moore (1997) notes that the Colombo Share Market was also successful in attracting 
investment as he observed that, for the first time ever, the stock market became the largest single 
source of new capital for the private sector’ in 1994 (Moore, 1997:360).  
3. Recent Trends 
Increased recognition and involvement in capital market and promoting dispersed ownership. 
The number of listed firms has grown from 141 in 1977 to 250 in 2011, showing an 
increase of 77 per cent in this period. This shows that many companies which have been 
registered prior to 1977 have sought equity capital. In 2002, the Government of Sri Lanka gave 
the non-nationals the permission to buy shares to the full value of issued capital of a listed 
company either through approved country funds, regional funds, and corporate bodies or as 
individuals subject to some exclusions and limitations. Due to these new measures taken, many 
of the established firms seized the opportunities to get listed and also were successful in 





mobilising equity capital (Samarakoon, 1999). Table 1shows that there is a dispersed ownership 
as well as large ownership of shares as in the case of other markets in both developed and 
emerging countries(La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). For example, a large number of 
shareholders holds less than 1,000 shares by each (86.7 percent of total shareholders) and a few 
numbers of large shareholders.  
 
Dispersed share ownership results in poor involvement in corporate governance as found 
in many developed capital markets (Stratling, 2003; Monks and Minow, 2004). Due to dispersion 
of risks across a section of stocks (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and due to various commitments, 
individual investors are not keen in corporate governance as witnessed by poor attendance for 
annual general meetings in the capital markets (Davies, 2003). On the other hand, large scale 
ownership has resulted in reducing agency conflicts and inevitably neglecting the interest of the 
minor shareholders (La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens and Pan, 2002).  
 
Table 1  
Size distribution of Shareholdings among the Shareholders (174 companies) 
Number of shares owned Number of shareholders Percentage of total* 
Less than 1,000 524,530 86.7 
1,001 – 5,000 53,521 8.8 
5,001 – 10,000 13,042 2.2 
10,001 – 50,000 10,021 1.7 
50,001 – 1,000,000 3,183 0.5 
Over 1 million 589 0.1 
Total 604,886 100 
Source: Survey data compiled using Handbook of Listed Companies, Colombo Stock Exchange  
 Increasing size of a Board and Decreasing Directorship per Director 
There are several noteworthy features in relation to the directorships of listed companies, 
as shown in Table 2. First, the average size of a board or the number of directorships in a quoted 
company has increased from 3.8 in 1951 to 5.4 in 1971 and 7.2 in 2004. Second, the average 
number of directorships per director has gradually decreased since 1951 to 2004 from 2.8 to 1.5 
respectively. Number of directors holding only one directorship also has increased from 56 in 
1951 to 76 in 2004.  Number of directors who hold multiple numbers of directorships (more than 
10 directorships) has been gradually decreasing from 14 in 1951 to 8 in 2004.  Cosh and Hughes 
(1987) find similar characteristics in relation to the directorship in large UK and US public 
companies.   
Table 2  
Distribution of Directorships of Quoted Companies, 1951, 1971, 1988 and 2004 
 1951 1971 1988 2004 
Number of quoted companies 189 153 176 243 
Total number of company directorships 718 824 1256 1766 
Average number of directorships per company 3.8 5.4 7.1 7.2 
Average number of directorships per director 2.8 2.2 1.6 1.5 
Percent of directors holding only 1 directorship 55 67 75 76 
Number of directors holding 10 or more directorships 14 12 4 8 
Percent of directorships held by persons holding 10 or more 22 17 4 .06 






Source: Compiled data from Moore (1997:353) and Handbook of Listed Companies, CSE.  
 
Greater involvement of internationally recognized few large Audit firms  
The financial statements of listed firms are audited by audit firms registered in Sri Lanka. 
Some of them are the branches of international audit firms. Table 3 shows that 90 percent of 
companies are audited by three international audit firms namely, KPMG, Ernest and Young, and 
Price Waterhouse Coopers. However, the lack of the presence of Deloitte Audit firm in Sri 
Lanka is also evident. The number of companies audited by them in 2004 is 98, 70 and 22 
respectively (Table 3). There is also a number of Sri Lankan audit firms among which, three 
firms (HLB Edirisinghe, Kreston M N S and Ford Rhodes Thornton) performed audit of 17 
companies. Small companies in terms of turnover and assets are usually audited by individual 
audit firms. Some authors argue that when the auditing is done by an international audit firm, 
better corporate transparency could be expected (Bushman, Piotroski and Smith, 2004).  







Concentration of Auditing of Corporate Sector 
Name of the audit firm No of firms 
KPMG 98 
Ernst and Young 70 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers 22 
HLB Edirisinghe & Co 7 
Kreston M N S & Co 6 
Ford Rhodes Thornton 4 
Each auditor having three firms 12 
Each auditor having two firms 8 
Single auditors each having one firm 12 
Total number of firms 239 
Source: Handbook of Listed Companies 2004, Colombo Stock Exchange 
Professional Orientation of Company Secretariat services  
A governance role that is changing in significant ways is that of the company secretary 
(Style, 2001). Although the role is less important in smaller companies, it is becoming more 
important in larger organisations where the company secretary is increasingly charged with 
ensuring good governance and compliance (Nicholson and Kiel (2004). They, however, note that 
the significance of a company’s secretary’s role in CG has not been researched adequately. 
Similarly, the issue of whether the secretariat function is needed by the small firms has not been 
empirically examined. Company Acts in the UK (sections 272 to 279 in 2006 Companies Act) 
and Sri Lanka (sections 221 and 222 in Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007) indicate various aspects 
of the company secretary such as the appointment, duties and qualifications.  
There are two types of company secretaries in Sri Lankan companies. 
(1) Legal and accountancy firms functioning as company secretaries. They provide  other 
services such as legal consultancy and accounting 
(2) Individual secretaries mainly consist of lawyers and chartered accountants. 
Among the legal and accountancy firms which function as company secretaries, one firm 
serves 16 companies on average, while the majority of the companies in the corporate sector are 
served by individual secretaries (number of firms 52) (see Table- 4). Company secretarial 
function is considered as a vital element in linking the shareholders with the management and 
the board of a company (Companies Act, 2006). Therefore, it is required to pay attention to the 
argument of Nicholson and Kiel (2004) who point out the lack of studies on this vital function 
and the need for research.   
Table 4 
Concentration of Corporate Secretarial Function 
Number of listed firms No of secretarial firms Number of individual 
secretaries 
Total 





1 firm 16 52 68 
2 firms 6 5 11 
3 firms 8 0 8 
4 firms 4 0 4 
5 – 10    firms 6 0 6 
11 – 15  firms 4 0 4 
16 – 20  firms 1 0 1 
       Total 45 57 102 
Source: Handbook of Listed Companies 2004, Colombo Stock Exchange 
4. Legal and regulatory framework 
Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007 
The Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 is the most significant regulation governing companies in Sri 
Lanka. This Act replaces the existing Companies Act No. 17 of 1982 which was based on the 
English Companies Act of 1948. The new Act was necessary to respond to the significant 
increase in commercial and economic activities in the country and its capital and financial 
markets in 1980s and 1990s.  The new Act moved away from traditional method of adopting UK 
laws and introduced features of company law in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.  
The new Company Act protects the interests of the shareholders and the other 
stakeholders including directors and managers in many ways. Shareholders have wider powers 
which they did not have in the 1982 Company Act. Shareholders and co-directors can sue the 
directors if they fail to exercise due care and diligence in business judgement. However, general 
duties of the directors are mentioned in the Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 in Sri Lanka as in the 
Companies Act of 2006 in the UK (section 171 to 177), which includes serving the company 
within the powers, promoting the business, and exercising reasonable judgment and care. 
However, corporations can decide what type of specific tasks the directors have to take in 
relation to the business activities.   
The new Act also gives power to the shareholders and directors to initiate derivative law 
suit actions (section 234-237). This is a new feature which was not available in the Company Act 
of 1982. Derivative law suit against the company is a right of the shareholders and the directors 
in many countries such as the US and the UK. However, according this section, the court has the 
right to decide to proceed or discontinue the proceedings. In the case of derivative suit actions, 
the company has to bear the cost of proceeding. At the same time, if the shareholders make false 
claims and if it is proven by the management in the Commercial Court, they could be made liable 
and could be prevented attending the subsequent shareholders’ meetings too.  
Another significant development in the new Act is that the minority shareholders are 
given the right to ask the company to buy-back the shares if they think some actions or decisions 
of the company would damage their interests. Major transactions such as amalgamation with 
another company, reduction of share capital which could affect the debt equity balance, change 
of the name of the company and status of the company are such situations (section 92(1) of the 
Companies Act of 2007). In such situations, the company has the obligation to meet certain 





conditions such as decisions on a fair and reasonable price and giving time to express objections 
by any disaffected shareholders (section 95 of the Companies Act of 2007). However, the 
Companies Act of 2007 has many checks and balances in the process of the buy-backs such as 
checking source of financing of buy-backs. According to the section 99, these actions should not 
contravene the rights of the shareholders.  
Directors of public companies are required to meet several criteria before they are 
appointed to the board of a public company. They include the upper age limits, declaration of the 
qualifications, declarations of the interest of the directors, re-election, removal, remuneration and 
restrictions on loans to directors. These criteria could be useful to the shareholders and other 
stakeholders to see that the directors have behaviour acceptable to them (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Accordingly, some of the decisions of the directors such as the amalgamation, winding up and 
compromises with creditors are required to obtain special approval of the shareholders at an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. However, the Act provides with directors the right to take 
indemnity and insurance cover. This shows evidence to suggest that the liability of directors is 
minimised in Sri Lanka too as found in many other countries by Cheffins and Black (2006).   
Legal provisions relating to insolvency laws in the country are an area to be developed 
further (Batra, 2006). In the new Act, there is special attention for the issues arising from 
winding up of a company due to bankruptcy (section 270 to 284 of the new Act). For example, in 
such satiations, the Act suggests, the appointment of the liquidator and administrator to protect 
the interest of all the stakeholders.  
Professionals Accounting and Auditing Institutions and Standards   
Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act No. 15 of 1995 provides for the formulation 
and statutory recognition of Sri Lanka accounting standards and Sri Lanka auditing standards.  A 
monitoring body (SLAASMB) has been set up under this in order to oversee the implementation 
of the above standards. Among the corporate governance problems widely discussed in literature 
are the accounting and auditing frauds, discussed as problems of earnings management (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999; Leuz, Nanada and Wysocki, 2003; Davidson, Stewart and Kent, 2005). 
Setting the accounting and auditing standards, implementation and monitoring of the practice are 
vital aspects in preventing earnings management. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri 
Lanka (ICASL) is responsible for the adoption of the accounting and auditing standards. ICASL 
is a member of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the International 
Standards of International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC).  
 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)   
While the Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007 provides the regulations necessary for the protection of 
the interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders including debtors, the SEC (established 
by the Securities Council Act No. 36 of 1987) has been granted the power to regulate the conduct 
of the security market in Sri Lanka. The SEC is the sole authority which can issue license to 
operate a stock exchange, appointment of stock brokers and dealers. In order to regulate the 





growing number of institutions such as the Unit Trusts, credit rating agencies and underwriters in 
the financial industry in Sri Lanka since early 1980s, the Securities Council Act No. 36 of 1987 
has been revised in 1991 and replaced in 2003 by the new Securities Council Act, No. 18 of 
2003. Objects of the SEC are: (1) the creation and maintenance of a market in which securities 
can be issued and traded in an orderly manner; (2) protection of the interests of investors; (3) 
operation of a compensation fund to protect investors from financial loss arising from any 
licensed stock broker or licensed stock dealer being found of not meeting his contractual 
obligations; and (4) regulation of the securities market and to ensure that professional standards 
are maintained in such market. Among the investor protection activities, the SEC ensures the 
compliance of firms to the regulations and prevention of insider trading activities. Listed 
companies are also required to submit the annual reports within a six months period of the close 
of the financial year and SEC pays attention for the disclosure level and the quality of financial 
and non financial information.  
 
Regulation of Listed Firms in the Financial Sector 
Boards of listed firms in the financial sector (commercial banks, merchant banks, finance 
companies, leasing companies, insurance companies, and long term credit institutions) come 
under twin control; that is the Registrar of Companies and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
(CBSL). Registrar of Companies in Sri Lanka has the statutory power of verification of the assets 
and liabilities of listed firms irrespective of the nature of the business. The Monetary Law Act 
No. 32 in 2002, Sri Lanka insists that the CBSL has the power to verify the assets and liabilities 
and general business activities of listed firms in the financial industry. Regulatory framework for 
the commercial banks are relatively more striker than the others in the financial industry as the 
commercial banks are required to comply with some international regulations such as the capital 
adequacy regulations (Basle Accord) of the International Bank for Settlements.  The boards of 
listed long-term credit institutions in the country (Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon, 
National Development Bank, Housing Development Corporation of Sri Lanka), come under the 
respective act of incorporation and some influence from the providers of long term capital such 
as International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank (World Bank, 2007). 
However, in the case of these long term credit institutions which were established by the Acts of 
the Parliament, the ultimate power rests with the parliament. Despite the ownership of 
shareholders both public and institutional, they have no special power to control or to appoint the 
boards for these institutions. This is a special situation in relation to the shareholder interests 
(World Bank, 2007).     
 
Finance Companies Act of 1998 
Among other public quoted companies in the financial industry, finance companies, 
insurance companies, leasing companies, mutual funds and unit trusts play a significant role in 
the economy (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2006). Finance companies are required to get 
registered under the Finance Companies Act, No 78 of 1988. Before 1988, finance companies 
were regulated under the Finance Companies Act No 27 of 1979, which was Insufficient to 
effectively supervise and regulate finance companies’ (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2004:25). The 





boards of many of the failed finance companies were responsible for the mismanagement of 
portfolio, corruption and lack of skills, which resulted in huge losses for the depositors and the 
tax payers (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2004). Of the 72 finance companies, which were 
operating before the enactment of the Finance Companies Act in 1988, only 25 could be able to 
register under the new Act (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2004). 
In order to operate a finance company in Sri Lanka, Finance Companies Act, No 78 of 
1988 emphasises the need to meet the following criteria: (1) minimum amount of capital 
requirement to be maintained; (2) maximum amount of share, an individual could have in the 
issued capital; (3) personal responsibility of the directors for the operations, and (4) submission 
of periodical reports to the CBSL. As a result of these strict regulations, confidence of the 
general public was restored in the finance companies as evidently shown in the growth of the 
finance companies in the later years (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2004).  
Insurance Industry Act of 2000 
The insurance industry is one of the highly regulated sectors in the country. Regulation of 
Insurance Industry Act, No. 30 of 2000 has created the Insurance Board of Sri Lanka (IBSL). To 
operate insurance business in Sri Lanka, companies are required to get a licence from the IBSL 
(in addition to the incorporation complying the Companies Act, No. 7 of 2007), and are subject 
to regulations and supervision of the IBSL. Insurance industry has not only statutory regulations 
but also self regulations in the form of guidelines for better service to the customers. Insurance 
Ombudsman is the non-regulatory body which has power to inquire into and settle any 
complaints and disputes between individual customers and the insurance institutions.  
 
The Fair Trading Commission Act of 1987 
In order to protect the public interests from monopolies, mergers and anti-competitive 
practices, Government of Sri Lanka has enacted the Fair Trading Commission in 1987 under the 
Act of No.1of 1987.  Section 11 of the Act specifies that a complaint of an existence of 
monopoly, merger or anti-competition in the business sector, will get the attention of the 
Commission to look into whether any of the above or all is detrimental to the general public of 
the country. Accordingly, fixing a maximum price for a product or service, while protecting the 
return on investments, is a key task of this Commission. Institute of Policy Studies (2002) points 
out that the above Commission has investigated number of complaints of several listed 
companies in the last few years with some decisions to penalise, while some claims have been 
rejected. However, the lack of funds of this Commission prevents the proper administration of 
the tasks of the Commission (Institute of Policy Studies, 2002). The above discussion reveals 
that the public listed companies in Sri Lanka are subjected to a number of statutory regulations. 
Therefore, what we see is that the economic enterprises are heavily regulated on the one 
hand and the regulations are scattered across several institutions on the other. This situation has 
been identified by Pierce and Waring (2004:333) as, ‘in Sri Lanka, there is a plethora of 
regulations in many forms’.  However, the selection of a regulatory system is a decision of the 
society. Governor of the CBSL speaking on the regulatory system of the banking industry in Sri 





Lanka says that ‘one needs to be practical and sensible in deciding the appropriate system for its 
financial services industry. The size of the country, the track record of supervisory authorities 
and, more importantly, the close interaction between the supervisory authority and the 
institutions to be supervised, are important considerations (Jayawardene, 2002).  
5. Evaluating the effectiveness of CG mechanism  
Unlike in the UK, regulatory impact assessment studies have not been undertaken in Sri Lanka 
on a continuous basis (Institute of Policy Studies, 2005). Therefore, the effectiveness of the 
regulations is discussed with the use of reports and literature available with the limitation of 
having difficulties in seeing a holistic view of effectiveness.   
According to Batra (2006), the Registrar of Companies in Sri Lanka works under limited 
resources. Therefore, the Registrar of Companies faces difficulties in achieving a full 
implementation of the overseeing responsibility, the state of compliance for the regulations on 
the submission of annual reports and the nature of disclosures in particular. ‘The office of the 
Registrar of Companies lacks the capacity to administer the official receivers and the liquidation 
process. They are not exposed to any education and training and are not schooled in best 
practices. However, ‘their integrity and independence are not in doubt’ (Batra, 2006:14).  
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) argue that insider trading laws are not effective in the 
emerging countries. La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer (2006) have examined the security laws of 
49 countries in which Sri Lanka has been included. These authors construct two indices namely 
the Disclosure Index and the Liability Index to see the strength of the security laws in a country.  
The disclosure index is computed by number of dimensions. They are: (1) the nature of 
the prospectus in particularly the compliance of it in relation to legal provisions; (2) 
compensation of directors and (3) shareholder structure and inside ownership. Liability index 
comprises the ability of the investors to make a claim. Sri Lanka stands below the mean value of 
the English origin countries in all the indices (Table 5).  
Table 5 
Sri Lanka – Indices of Regulation of Securities Markets 
 Mean Score 
 Sri Lanka Countries with 
English Laws 
applicable 
Disclosure requirements 0.75 0.78 
Liability Standard 0.39 0.58 
Supervisor characteristics 0.33 0.48 
Rule making power 1.00 0.67 
Investigative power 0.50 0.75 
Orders 0.00 0.57 
Criminal sanctions 0.33 0.65 
Public enforcement 0.43 0.62 





Source: La Porta, De-Silanes and Shleifer (2006:15). 
 The first row shows the Sri Lanka situation and the second row shows the mean value for 
the countries where English law prevails. However, the value for disclosure is 0.75 and it is close 
to the mean value of 0.78. The value of regulations or the rule making power is 1.00 which is 
above the mean value of 0.67.   
There is also evidence to show that implementation of the regulations has been further 
strengthened in recent years. In the annual report of the SEC (SEC, 2006), several cases of 
misconduct of the directors are mentioned along with the actions taken by the SEC. Among them 
is the selling of shares of family members of some directors at higher prices with the knowledge 
of sensitive market information. Such declarations in the annual report of the SEC on the conduct 
of the directors of the listed companies may deter the directors as violation of trading rules has 
been occurred. However, there is no follow up research to identify its effect. Abeysekera (2001) 
notes that SEC has made substantial progress to ensure market efficiency with ‘freely available 
information, competition among investors and effective communication among market 
participants’ (2001:251). 
The responsibility and the emphasis of the auditors in Sri Lanka in early 1980s was to 
ensure that the company management prepares annual reports to show that there is a true and fair 
view of the accounts (Perera, 1980).  Perera (1980:122) notes that ‘there has been not much 
discussion in Sri Lanka on the rational behind annual reports and the information value of the 
financial statements they generate’. This scenario has been improved gradually. For example, the 
ICASL organises an annual competition to select the best annual report among the listed as well 
as the unlisted corporate sector since 1964. Since 2000, this annual competition focuses on three 
areas, namely, Good Corporate Governance Disclosure Award, Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reporting, and Management Commentary Award. Further, there is evidence to suggest that the 
authority is keen to see the implementation of the accounting and auditing standards.  
Some international research studies find a better disclosure situation in Sri Lanka. 
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003) in their research on corporate transparency of 45 countries 
selected during a period of five years from 1990 to 1995, points out that there are some 
promising countries which can take up the challenge of developing corporate governance in par 
with the developed countries and Sri Lanka is one of them. These authors have used a number of 
variables, namely, financial disclosures (segments reporting, capital expenditure on research and 
development and others, accounting policies, declaration about subsidiaries), governance 
disclosure (size of major shareholders, management personnel, boards and their remuneration, 
director and officer shareholdings), accounting principles, timeliness of disclosures, and 
credibility of disclosures. According to their findings, the best disclosure of governance 
information is found is Singapore (100 points) and next comes for Sri Lanka (97.83 points). UK 
accounts for 94.57 points, while the US stands for only 75.72 points. In disclosure variables, the 
UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Japan Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland are in equal footing (100 points) but the US is behind. Chairman of International 





Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has praised the standards of accounting disclosures in Sri 
Lanka (Ceylon Daily News, 2005). Existence of number of regulatory bodies in Sri Lanka may a 
possible factor for the high level of disclosure  
Although Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003) have not obtained the data on the number 
of audit firms in Sri Lanka and on the strength of the audit function in the quoted companies in 
Sri Lanka, 80 percent of the auditing of the corporate sector has been done by the internationally 
recognized  audit companies (Handbook of Listed Companies, 2004). According to Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith (2003:213), ‘…audit is a measure of the credibility of financial disclosures.  
6. Issues and challenges of CG in Sri Lanka 
Common CG issues range from a simple misuse of shareholders funds such as the employment 
of a person not suitable for a job but known to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or spending to 
beautify the office of the CEO more than the needed comforts to discharge the duties or pure 
thefts and payment of salary and bonuses not commensurate with job performance etc. are 
among a large number of ways of deviating the shareholders funds discussed across many 
countries by the researchers (Berle and Means, 1933; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki, 2003).  
Similarly, in the recent past, a number of CG problems in Sri Lanka have been reported. 
They include issues such as the collapse of number of finance companies in mid 1980s, and 
misuse of funds of a private commercial bank and a finance company in mid 1990s and early 
2000. However, the tax payers had to bear the minimum cost due to prompt action taken by the 
Government and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2008).  
The growth of the number of quoted companies since 1978 shows the emergence of wide 
participation in the equity capital and the eventual and inevitable emergence of agency conflicts 
(e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Although there is an international presence of audit firms, majority of the corporate sector 
have not yet developed audit committees. In a survey done by the SEC to see the level of 
establishment of audit committees, SEC found that only 62 percent of companies have 
established audit committees (out of 132 companies responded to a survey of 239 companies as 
at July 20, 2005) (SEC, 2005). This report shows many grey areas in audit related functions such 
as the inclusion of the CEO and some other executives also in the audit committees. Pierce and 
Waring (2004) find that the audit committees in the listed companies in Sri Lanka spend only 
around 15 minutes together and in some occasions hardly any attendance by the full committee 
members even. 
Using data from the Worldwide Governance indicators for 2005, the World Bank (2006) 
reports that democratic accountability and clean government go hand in hand’ (2006:7). The 
politicians and the officers well understand the need to protect independence to develop free 
trade but they do not allow the legal framework to establish its root (Irvin, 2001; La Porta et el., 





2004). La Porta et el., (2004) find that politicians who get a rent from the business community 
prevent competition in order to enjoy the privileges. Business firms get abnormal profit as a 
result and they too make various barriers for the new firms to come.  
Political interferences affect the implementation of the regulations in the country as found 
by many authors. Thus, the protection of the interests of the shareholders and the other 
stakeholders are at stake even though the regulatory framework is in force (Weerakoon, 1995; 
Wickramasinghe, Hopper and Rathnasiri, 2004; Ratnayakara, 2006). Ratnayakara (2006, p.1) 
referring to the political influences states;   
“Despite all the rules and regulations protecting various stakeholders, we have seen 
gross violations against the rights of minority shareholders as well as customers and 
competitors in recent times by powerful individuals who are able to throw their weight 
and flex their muscle in addition to dropping names thus instilling fear in the minds of 
regulators, in resorting to the acts. Very often are powerful stakeholder infringes on the 
rights of other stakeholders, competitors, employees, minority shareholders and even 
the fellow directors”.  
The freedom for entrepreneurs to establish business could be measured by several 
indicators. Miles, Holms and O’Grady (2006) define economic freedom as ‘the absence of 
government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and 
services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself’ (Miles, 
Holms and O’Grady, 2006:56). In order to measure economic freedom, these authors used fifty 
economic variables categorising them into ten broad categories, i.e. trade policy, fiscal burden of 
government, intervention of the government in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and 
foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation and 
informal market activity. All of these variables are treated equally important. The overall 
economic freedom score of a country is based on the simple average of ten individual factor 
scores. The score for each factor varies from one to five. A score of one signifies an economic 
environment or set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom, while a score of 
five signifies a set of policies that are least conducive to economic freedom.  Four broad 
categories of economic freedom in the index are: Free (countries with an average overall score of 
1.99 or less), Mostly free (countries with an average overall score of 2.00 to 2.99), mostly un-
free (countries with an average overall score of 3.00 to 3.99) and repressed (countries with an 
average overall score of 4.00 or higher). According to this index, Sri Lanka belongs to mostly 
un-free category with a score of 3.19.  
 
Economic and political freedom is two other significant factors which decide the state of 
protection of rights of investors in a country (Reed, 2004).  La Porta et al., (2004) measure 
political freedom by several sources such as an index of political rights, democracy index, and 
index of human rights (2004:452). Barro (1999) introduces an easy to understand measure of 
political rights categorised into seven on the basis of the amount of electoral rights. Group one is 





the highest level of rights and groups seven is the lowest. Sri Lanka has been included in 
between the democracy and dictatorship (Barro, 1999). Among many other factors, bureaucratic 
inefficiency (Mauro, 1995) and poor enforcement of law (La Porta et el. 1999) result in creating 
a large shadow economy, in developing countries including Sri Lanka (Schneider and Enste, 
2000). These authors point out that the percentage of the shadow economy in Sri Lanka is around 
38-50 percent. This is no doubt a very large drain of, otherwise the legitimate property of the 
general public or the potential investors.     
Filatotchev et al., (2007) identified the significance of the role of institutional investors as 
a corporate governance mechanism. In a developing country like Sri Lanka, domestic 
institutional investors could play a vital role in many forms in the capital market as pointed out 
by Reisen (2000), i.e. by making information available, increasing market liquidity, lowering 
transition costs, facilitating market participation by the general public, helping businesses raising 
capital, making privatisation possible, playing a role in corporate monitoring and attracting 
foreign investors. According to Pierce and Waring (2004), investor activism and stakeholder 
activism is in increasing trend in Sri Lanka, although it is not sufficient.  
7. Conclusion   
The above discussion points out that Sri Lanka have a growing corporate sector and a large scale 
regulatory framework established with the growth of the corporate sector since the introduction 
of the free market policies in 1977.  However, as Anand (2006) points out the balance of both 
regulatory and non-regulatory codes on corporate governance brings harmony and less cost for 
both companies and the regulators. The paper argues that statutory rules and regulations enforce 
compliance cost for the companies and even could stifle the growth of the corporate sector 
especially the firms seeking the equity capital. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2000 has discouraged some 
firms to enter the equity market and also some firms now tend to go back to leveraged buy-outs 
and privatise (Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Zhang, 2007).  
The regulatory bodies also have to meet the cost of maintenance of office and a 
professional staff to see that listed firms comply with the regulations (FSA, 2006). However, if 
there are only non-regulatory codes on corporate governance, the investors have to bear the cost 
of verifying the state of corporate governance in each and every firm they wish to invest (Anand, 
2006). Investors are unable to find out the nature of corporate governance or about the true 
nature of declarations in financial statements due to the lack of knowledge and resources 
(Turnbull, 1997). Due to information barriers, the investors would not be able to get a correct 
picture of the firms. Therefore, a balance of both statutory regulatory and non-regulatory codes 
on corporate governance could be effective (Anand, 2006).      
As indicated in the paper, there is a need for in depth studies examining the CG practices 
in emerging economies and CG practices in these countries have not come under scrutiny. For 
example, little is known about the appointment of non-executive directors, their sources of 
origin, training, evaluation and their in comparisons to the situation in developed capital markets 
(Higgs, 2003). The external corporate governance mechanisms too are not transparent enough 





and are not fully functional due to the smallness of the corporate sector. There have been few 
corporate takeovers but the process and the outcome is not so transparent due to the involvement 
of the politicians in the process. Researchers must come forward to develop a research agenda 
especially in behavioural side of corporate governance in the country. This paper shed some light 
in this regard.  
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